Virus Labs & Distribution
VLAD #6 - What


  
  Future Techniques
  컴컴컴컴컴컴컴컴

  Polymorphism:
  It is possible to read/write to the code of a PE virus, therefore
  polymorphism will continue to exist as part of the virus writers
  repetoire under Win95.  Although, polymorphic routines will 
  change slightly to produce 32 bit code.

  Entrypoints:
  The PE executable has a weakness due to the numerous relocations
  inside it.  It would be possible to get an API function such as
  ExitProcess or PostQuitMessage and change the import table entry
  for it, to point to the virus exit.  The original relocation address
  can be replaced to point to the virus entry instead.  When an
  application quits, the virus will be run instead.  In this way
  the "Entry Point RVA" doesn't need to be modified to gain control
  during running of the program, which makes the task of virus detection
  very cumbersome because every entry point would have to be scanned.

  Memory Residence:
  The technique described above can be used to advantage as a sort of memory
  residence.  If a virus direct action infected KERNEL32.EXE and took
  control of the KERNEL function CreateProcessA, it could infect every
  file as it was executed.
  
  Using API functions such as GlobalAlloc could provide a means for proper
  memory allocation, or else modifying the 386 "Descriptor Tables" manually.

  Low-Level:
  All Win95 applications run at Ring-3.  At this level a program can't
  do such things as read/write to hardware ports directly.  Ring-0
  has full control of the system.  For information on how to gain Ring-0
  in Win31 get the file RING0.EXE from /softlib/MSLFILES on
  ftp.microsoft.com.  The code in this small example is not truly
  applicable to win95.  It uses int 2f calls to modify descriptors, this
  is not possible under win95 as interrupts cannot be accessed.

  Real Mode:
  It could be possible to switch the processor back to real-mode using
  low-level instructions, and use interrupts from there.  This would
  require some hole in the win95 defense system...

  Vxd's:
  Vxd's existed under win31 and they still exist under win95.  Vxd's run
  at ring 0 and thus have as much access to the system as the kernel.
  Although safe guards are in place to stop vxd's from running rampant,
  a vxd can do just about anything it wants, including changing
  selectors and descriptor tables.  You can expect to see lots of
  information on vxd's in future.
  

- VLAD #6 INDEX -

ARTICLE.1_1      

Introduction
ARTICLE.1_2       Aims and Policies
ARTICLE.1_3       Greets
ARTICLE.1_4       Members/Joining
ARTICLE.1_5       Dist/Contact Info
ARTICLE.1_6       Hidden Area Info
ARTICLE.1_7       Coding the Mag

ARTICLE.2_1      

Resist!
ARTICLE.2_2       IBM-AV
ARTICLE.2_3       MIME Disasm
ARTICLE.2_4       Dark Fiber Tunneling
ARTICLE.2_5       Bait Detection
ARTICLE.2_6       MCB Stealth
ARTICLE.2_7       RHINCE2

ARTICLE.3_1      

Win95 Intro
ARTICLE.3_2       Win95 tute
ARTICLE.3_3       PE header format
ARTICLE.3_4       Bizatch
ARTICLE.3_5       The Boza Situation
ARTICLE.3_6       Bizatch News
ARTICLE.3_7       What's Next ?

ARTICLE.4_1      

Virus Descriptions
ARTICLE.4_2       Gilgamesh
ARTICLE.4_3       VIP
ARTICLE.4_4       SVL 1.2
ARTICLE.4_5       TFIWWB
ARTICLE.4_6       nimd00d3
ARTICLE.4_7       386 Virus

ARTICLE.5_1      

CLME Disasm
ARTICLE.5_2       Timber Wolf
ARTICLE.5_3       Serrelinda
ARTICLE.5_4       Insert v1.7
ARTICLE.5_5       Backwards
ARTICLE.5_6       TraceVir
ARTICLE.5_7       Lapis Lazuli

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